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I. INTRODUCTION: THE DOUBLE PARADOX OF PUBLIC
EMPLOYER AND PUBLIC EMPLOYEE
The term "public employer" is something of a legal oxymoron.
Although the law has established a jurisprudence for the employer,
consisting of a network of state and federal statutory requirements,'
and a jurisprudence for the governmental body, governed by the
Constitution, the public employer belongs to neither of these. It is an
entity that functions as a private business, charged with maintaining
an efficient and productive workplace.2 It is constantly under pres-
sure to improve performance, and it is just as concerned with
discipline, morale, and efficiency as any private employer. Yet it is
also part of the sovereign and therefore considered a potential tyrant.
By the same token, the public employee has a split personality.
As a citizen of the United States, the public employee is entitled to
constitutional protections, including the right to free speech under the
First Amendment. Yet as an employee of the government, the public
employee is often under the control of her employer and may be ex-
1. For an excellent overview of employment law, see Mark A. Rothstein, Andria S.
Knapp, and Lance Liebman, Cases and Materials on Employment Law (Foundation Press, 2nd
ed. 1991).
2. For an introduction to the restraints placed on the government employer, see the Code
of Federal Regulations (1996). For particular efficiency requirements, see the Index to the Code
of Federal Regulations (1995) under any of the following headings: Cost Effectiveness, Cost
Accounting, Cost Estimates, Improvement Costs, Maintenance Costs, or Operating Costs.
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pected to compromise those rights in order to contribute to the effi-
cient functioning of the employer.
These dual roles create a conundrum for the courts. The issue
of public employee free speech highlights the problem. A private
employer may fire an at-will employee on the basis of her speech with
no fear of legal repercussions. 3 Yet a governmental entity is subject to
the strictures of the First Amendment.4 When a government official
fires an at-will employee because of speech, that official is arguably
abridging that employee's freedom of speech. Public employment
therefore necessitates a first amendment analysis that takes these
paradoxes into account.
The Supreme Court originally considered the public employer's
role as employer and the public employee's role as employee
preeminent. The Court therefore altogether denied public employees'
free speech rights in the context of employers' firing decisions.5
During the 1970s, however, the Court recognized the public
employer's second identity as a state actor and provided a right of
action for public employees fired on the basis of their speech.6 To
establish the boundaries of that right, the Court had to balance the
3. A private employer may fire an at-will employee for any reason at all. See Rothstein,
Knapp, and Liebman, Employment Law at 839 (cited in note 1). The private employer is not
regulated by the First Amendment. At least one scholar, however, has suggested that the
"public policy exception" to the at-will employment doctrine, see id. at 846, should include
violations of the First Amendment, see id. at 536 (citing Note, Protecting Private Employees'
Freedom of Political Speech, 18 Harv. J. Legis. 35, 85-89 (1981) (arguing for an expansion of
common-law public policy exceptions to include the First Amendment)). See also Norosel v.
Nationwide Insurance, 721 F.2d 894, 900 (3d Cir. 1983) (finding that under Pennsylvania law, a
violation of the employee's first amendment rights is sufficient to invoke the public policy
exception).
4. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech... ." U.S. Const.,
Amend. I. Although the First Amendment literally applies only to the legislature, the Court has
interpreted the Free Speech Clause to provide protection against individual employment deci-
sions. See note 6 and accompanying text. Because a governmental official often cites a rule or
regulation governing the workplace to support the firing decision, that rule or regulation could
be considered the "law" abridging the speech. However, the Court often does not explicitly make
this connection in its public employee free speech cases. Instead, the particular firing decision
itself is the focal point for first amendment analysis. See, for example, Pickering v. Board of
Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 565 (1967).
5. See notes 12-19 and accompanying text.
6. This right of action provides the public employee with only indirect protection: an
employee first must be fired for his or her speech before invoking the First Amendment to
protect that speech. Charles Hemingway labels such first amendment protection ex post
regulation of speech, as opposed to the normal ex ante analysis the Court uses to evaluate a
statute or regulation. Charles W. Hemingway, A Closer Look at Waters v. Churchill and United
States v. National Treasury Employees Union- Constitutional Tensions Between the
Government as Employer and the Citizen as Federal Employee, 44 Am. U. L. Rev. 2231, 2233 n.5
(1995).
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interest of the public employer as a private entity against the dangers
of governmental censorship posed by the public employer as sovereign
that the First Amendment was designed to prevent.7
The Supreme Court has developed a two-step analysis that at-
tempts such a balance. 8 First, the Court determines whether the
speech at issue is "of public concern," for only such speech merits
protection under this framework.9 To the great consternation of lower
courts and scholars alike, however, the Court has failed to provide a
clear definition for "public concern." If the Court determines that the
speech is of public concern, it moves to the second step of the analysis
and weighs the employee's interest in speaking freely against the
employer's interest in maintaining efficiency.10 This assessment bal-
ances the "value" of the speech against the potential for disruption to
the workplace.
This Note argues that the first prong of the public employment
free speech test is flawed. Under the current "public concern" thresh-
old test, the Court evaluates both the content of the speech in ques-
tion and the context in which it was uttered: the where, when, and to
whom of the speech.", Analyzing the content of the speech, however,
creates serious doctrinal problems within first amendment jurispru-
dence. This Note urges the Court to take a closer look at "public
concern" and define it without reference to the content of the speech
at issue. The Court should define "public concern" speech not as
speech concerning an issue of public importance, but as speech to the
public. To this end, the Note proposes that the Court redefine "public
concern!' as speech spoken outside the scope of the speaker's
employment. The scope of employment test ensures that the public
7. The tension in public employee free speech can be defined as the difficulty in balancing
the employee's right to free speech against the governmens concern with maintaining an
efficient workplace. This characterization, however, fails to strike at the heart of the problem:
the dual nature of the government employer itself. The difficulty is not so much how to balance
an individual's right against the governments interest; that balancing act pervades all of
constitutional law. Instead, the complication confronted in this area of law is that the
governmental body at issue has multiple personalities, each of which demands a particular
standard of conduct.
8. See Part II.B.2 (describing the Coures formulation of the test in Connick v. Myers, 461
U.S. 138 (1983)).
9. See notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
10. Scholars have often complained that governmental efficiency should not
counterbalance individual rights. The Court, however, has stated that in the context of the
public workplace, efficiency gains weight in the first amendment balance and become an
important consideration when analyzing infringements on freedom of speech. See Waters v.
Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 675 (1994) ("rhe government's interest in achieving its goals as
effectively and efficiently as possible is elevated from a relatively subordinate interest when it
acts as sovereign to a significant one when it acts as employer.").
11. See notes 80-87 and accompanying text.
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employer infringes upon a public employee's right to free speech only
within the context of the public employee's role as employee-the role
that necessitated the infringement.
Part II of this Note explores the history behind the public em-
ployee free speech framework. Part III suggests that the Court's
current analysis is unworkable. Part IV proposes both a redefinition
of "public concern" and a shift in the effect of the public concern
prong.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Destruction of the Rights/Privilege Distinction: Once a
Citizen, Always a Citizen
The Supreme Court's analysis of a public employee's right to
free speech has gone through two stages: 12 the rights/privilege ap-
proach and what this Note labels the public concern doctrine. 13
12. Several critics have identified more than two stages. See, for example, Developments
in the Law-Public Employment, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1611, 1739 (1984) (delineating three stages:
pre-1950s (no protection), 1950s through 1960s (recognition of limitations imposed by the
Constitution), and post 1960s (an increasing emphasis on the public's interests when determin-
ing protection)); Cynthia K. Y. Lee, Comment, Freedom of Speech in the Public Workplace: A
Comment on the Public Concern Requirement, 76 Cal. L. Rev. 1109, 1112 (1988) (identifying
three stages). However, both of these "multiple-stage" analyses describe two mega-stages of
rights/privilege (no protection) and post-rights/privilege. During the latter stage, the Court has
used the public concern test to determine what speech is protected.
13. This development parallels the development of the public forum doctrine, another area
of first amendment law. Public forum doctrine governs free speech on government-owned
property. There appear to be at least three important connections between public forums and
public workplaces. First, in both public forum and public employment law, the government
plays a dual role of sovereign and citizen. In public forum law, the court must deal with the
practicalities of the governmenes role as landowner, and in public employment law, it must
confront the government as employer. Though the Constitution forbids the government from
abridging any citizen's freedom of speech, it is impractical not to allow some sort of regulation of
speech on government property or in the workplace. Efficiency demands regulation. Second,
federal courts have considered a public employee's use of a public forum to air her speech a valid
factor in evaluating whether that speech is on a matter of public concern. Third, the public
workplace is itself a subset of the public forum: the government acts as proprietor of the
workplace. These connections support an interpretation of public employee free speech that
takes the principles of public forum jurisprudence into account. Although the employment
relationship itself prevents the analogy from being perfect, the principles of public forum law
certainly could bear on any discussion of public employment law. Strangely, however, the Court
has not chosen to use those principles, a fact which may well explain some of the present
confusion over public employment law.
Public forum jurisprudence evolved from the same rights/privilege distinction as did public
concern jurisprudence. The Court originally reasoned that if the government could control
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Under the rights/privilege approach, the Court afforded a
public employee no greater protection as a speaker than that afforded
a private employee. 14 The public employee's status as an employee
meant that he or she was subject to the will of the employer. The
Court reasoned that since public employment is a privilege granted by
the government and not a right itself, the public employee could not,
during that employment, claim absolute rights otherwise guaranteed
a private citizen.1 5 Therefore, freedom of speech, though established
as a universal right in the Constitution,1s did not apply as such for
those labeled "employees." Justice Holmes summed up this
philosophy in a famous comment on disciplining a police officer for his
speech: "The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk
politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman."'
Justice Holmes's analysis seems to suggest that by accepting a job as
a public employee, a person waives her constitutional rights.'8 The
access to its property, it could regulate the conduct-and thus the speech--of those to whom it
granted such access. See Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History
and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. Rev. 1713, 1722-23 (1987) (describing the Court's
original rights/privilege approach); Davis v: Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 47-48 (1897) (stating
that the government as proprietor can absolutely limit speech on its premises just as a private
person may limit speech within his residence). In both areas of jurisprudence, however, the
Supreme Court soon abandoned the rights/privilege distinction, recognizing that even though
the government may have a quasi-private interest as part of its dual role in certain situations,
citizens may not be stripped of their rights even though they may take on the second role of
public invitee or public employee. For public forum cases upholding this principle, see Hague v.
Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496, 514-16 (1939) (rejecting implication in
Davis that citizens' rights under the Constitution disappear within a public forum); Jamison v.
Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 416 (1943) ("[O]ne who is rightfully on a [public street] carries with him
there as elsewhere the constitutional right to express his views in an orderly fashion."). For the
seminal public employment case upholding this principle, see Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385
U.S. 589, 604 (1967) (holding unconstitutional a statute abridging public teachers' freedom of
speech). The First Amendment is still potent even within the confines of a government-
regulated workplace and even on government property.
14. Private employers are not bound by the First Amendment. See note 3.
15. The leading case on the rights/privilege distinction is Adler v. Board of Educ. of New
York City, 342 U.S. 485 (1952), overruled in part by Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 595. In Adler, the
Court essentially nullified a teacher's right to free association by virtue of her employment with
the state. Id. at 491-93.
16. The protection is "universal," in that the amendment does not itself provide for distinc-
tions based on employment or status as a public employee. U.S. Const., Amend. I ("Congress
shall make no law... ."). For a view that the First Amendment is truly "absolute" and cannot
be infringed, see Alexander Meiklejohn's works: Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment
Is an Absolute, 1961 S. Ct. Rev. 245; Alexander Meiklejohn, Political Freedom: The
Constitutional Powers of the People (Oxford U., 1965). Even if the First Amendment does not
guarantee absolute freedom of speech in all situations, see, for example, Robert Bork, Neutral
Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L. J. 1 (1971), there does not appear to
be any credible evidence that it was not intended to apply equally to all citizens of the United
States.
17. McAuliffe v. City-of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517, 517-18 (1892).
18. See id. at 220 (There are few employments for hire in which the servant does not
agree to suspend his constitutional right of free speech.., by the implied terms of his
998
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Court, however, never required the employer to obtain a waiver of
free speech rights from the employee. Instead, the Court seemed to
recognize the act of becoming a public employee of the government as
sufficient to eliminate the right to freedom of speech.19
The rights/privilege distinction made little sense because it
ignored the fact that public employees are not only employees but also
citizens. By denying an individual her constitutional rights as soon as
she became an "employee," the Court essentially was saying that the
individual ceases to be a citizen of the United States when she works
for the government, (or alternatively, that the government ceases to
be a state actor when it acts as an employer20). Nothing in the
Constitution supports this abrogation of an individual's freedom;
indeed, such an interpretation is an anathema to the Bill of Rights. 21
The Court soon recognized this contradiction and concluded that the
public employee does not "shed[ ] his or her first amendment freedom
at the portal of work or school."22
contract."). Of course, this analysis does not include those employees who are not under
contract. See generally William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction
in Constitutional Law, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1439 (1968) (evaluating Holmes's pronouncement in
terms of waiver under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine).
19. Charles Hemingway argues that a citizen's change in status from non-employee to
employee still undergirds all of public employee free speech jurisprudence. Hemingway, 44 Am.
U. L. Rev. at 2239-41 (cited in note 6). Mr. Hemingway appears to equate becoming a federal
appointee with becoming part of the government itself: the federal employee must accept closer
control over her personal speech because she is now subject to the strictures of the government
itself. Id. at 2241-42. This Note disagrees and argues that any distinct treatment of public
employee free speech should be based on the employment relationship rather than on the public
employee's status as "employee." See notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
20. See Post, 34 UCLA L. Rev. at 1763 (cited in note 13). Professor Post addresses a
parallel problem in public forum jurisprudence. He argues that
the fact that the government is acting as an employer or a proprietor will not exempt it
from the distinct requirements of the equal protection clause, or the due process clause,
or the commerce clause, or the privileges and immunities clause of article IV.
And... there is no good reason why that fact should exempt the government from the
requirements of the first amendment.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
21. The first ten amendments to the United States Constitution specifically protect rights
of citizens or persons of the United States. These rights are not predicated on any factor other
than the individual rightholder's identity as a citizen or a person. See, for example, U.S. Const.,
Amend. II C'[The right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." (emphasis
added)). See generally Meiklejohn, Political Freedom at 8-28 (cited in note 16).
22. Toni M. Massaro, Significant Silences: Freedom of Speech in the Public Sector
Workplace, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 33 (1987) (paraphrasing Tinker v. Des Moines Community
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers
shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.")).
Notably, this statement characterizes the rights/privilege distinction as one based on the
workplace rather than on the identity of the public employee as an employee. It defines the
Court's approach as based upon where the First Amendment applies (outside the workplace)
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:993
In Keyishian v Board of Regents, 23 the Court abandoned the
rights/privilege doctrine altogether.24 In Keyishian, a number of em-
ployees of the New York state university system brought suit under
the First Amendment.25 The university had discharged them or de-
clined to renew their contracts because the employees refused to sign
a document stating that they were not affiliated with certain
organizations. 26 The Keyishian Court held the terminations invalid
because requiring the signed document as a condition of employment
violated the employees' first amendment rights.27 In so doing, the
Court rejected the trial court's rights/privilege holding that the
teachers had not been denied their freedom of speech or assembly, but
only one of a full range of choices regarding where to work.
28
The Keyishian court reversed the trial court's holding but it
offered no new mode of analysis. It thus created a void in public
employment jurisprudence. It eliminated the rights/privilege
distinction as a valid approach to public employees' rights, but did not
offer a replacement. The tension between public employer efficiency
and individual rights continued.
B. Recognition of the Value of Public Employee Free Speech: The
Supreme Court Becomes Publicly Concerned
A handful of Supreme Court cases decided over the last three
decades define the second, modern stage of public employee free
speech.2 9 These cases champion an approach antithetical to the
rather than based upon to whom it applies (non-employees). This implies that the Court
originally meant to define public employee rights with reference to the employment
relationship. See notes 135-38 and accompanying text (arguing that the employment
relationship is both the genesis and the limit on the public employer's ability to infdnge upon an
employee's free speech).
23. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
24. Id. at 605-06 ("Mhe theory that public employment which may be denied altogether
-may be subjected to any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable, has been uniformly
rejected." (adopting language of the lower court)); id. at 606 ("It is too late in the day to doubt
that the liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing of
conditions upon a benefit or privilege." (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963))).
25. Id. at 591-92.
26. Id. at 592.
27. Id. at 609.
28. Id. at 605-06.
29. This is another area where scholars disagree over the taxonomy of public employee
free speech doctrine. See note 12. Critics sometimes identify an intermediate stage
characterized by limited recognition of individual rights in the public workplace. See, for
example, Lee, 76 Cal. L. Rev. at 1112 (cited in note 12). However, the case that began the next
stage, Pickering, see Part II.B.1, followed so closely on Keyishian's heels that there was little
time to develop a new doctrine in the interim.
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rights/privilege distinction. The public employer's identity as a gov-
ernmental entity gains meaning and competes with its identity as an
employer. The public employee's concurrent identity as a citizen also
surfaces. The new approach appeared to be an enlightened view of
public employment. However, it soon caused problems of its own.
1. Pickering v. Board of Education
Public concern doctrine ° began in 1968 with Pickering v.
Board of Education.31 In Pickering, the Court evaluated the discharge
of a public high school teacher who was fired because of a letter he
submitted to the local paper.32 The teacher accused the Board of
Education of forcing faculty to support a tax proposal at the expense
of the teachers' own views.33 Several of the statements proved to be
false, but by and large the letter was true, and very critical of both the
Board and the superintendent. 4 In response to Pickering's letter, the
Board determined by a full hearing that the letter disrupted the effi-
ciency of the school system3 5 and therefore terminated the teacher.36
Pickering brought an action in federal court claiming that his ter-
mination violated the First Amendment.3 7 Under the rights/privilege
approach, the action would have failed, but the Court now crafted a
new analysis to evaluate Pickering's case.
The Supreme Court held that the termination violated
Pickering's first amendment right to free speech.38 It engaged in a
balancing test, weighing the employee's rights against the employer's.
The Court stated that a balance must be struck "between the inter-
ests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public
concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting
the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employ-
ees."39 Thus public concern doctrine was born.
30. The first prong of the text has attracted the most attention and thus bears the banner
for the entire test.
31. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
32. Id. at 564.
33. Id. at 565-66, 570, 575-78.
34. Id. at 573, 575-78.
35. Id. at 564-65 (describing the Board's finding that the letter was "detrimental to the
efficient operation and administration of the schools of the district').
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 574-75.
39. Id. at 568 (emphasis added).
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In crafting its new first amendment analysis, the Court drew
on past cases like Keyishian to support its decision not to bow blindly
to the public employer's interests. 40 The public employer's identity as
an employer would no longer outweigh the public employee's identity
as a citizen entitled to first amendment rights. To develop the new
approach, the Court drew analogies to libel law, citing references to
defamatory statements against public officials and claims for invasion
of privacy based on matters of public interest.41 The Court apparently
drew a connection to defamation jurisprudence because of its
emphasis on valuing speech according to its content. In defamation
law, "untrue" speech is considered of lesser value than "true" speech;42
in the Court's new assessment of public employee free speech, "non-
public concern" speech would be of lesser value than "public concern"
speech.
Unfortunately, the Pickering Court did not define its new con-
cept of "public concern." The Court gave no examples of public con-
cern speech other than the one at hand. Instead, it provided a few
clues as to when speech may not be protected. These examples all
focused on speech between certain categories of speakers and
listeners whose relationships the Court felt were necessary to the
public workplace. 43
40. Id.
41. Id. at 573. The Court cited New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967), among others. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 573. The analogy
to libel law was logical because several of Pickering's statements were untrue. In later cases,
however, the Court did not continue to examine defamation jurisprudence. Instead, it formu-
lated an entirely new test for what it apparently perceived as a "new" area of first amendment
analysis. This was an unfortunate decision; if the Court had continued its attention to defama-
tion law, it might have avoided the "public concern" test altogether. See notes 94-98 and accom-
panying text.
42. See Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law 1081-83 (Foundation Press, 12th ed. 1991);
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
43. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569-70 & n.3. The Court in Pickering identified statements
uttered in "the kind of close working relationships... [wherein] personal loyalty and confidence
are necessary to their proper functioning," id. at 570, statements "directed towards any person
with whom appellant would normally be in contact in the course of his daily work as a teacher,"
id. at 569-70, statements by employees in "positions... in which the need for confidentiality
is... great," id. at 570 n.3, and statements by employees in "positions ... in which the
relationship between superior and subordinate is of such a personal and intimate nature
that ... public criticism of the superior by the subordinate would seriously undermine.., the
working relationship," id. Such statements raise questions different from those raised by
Pickering itself, and the results they necessitate may even be antithetical to the Pickering
holding.
Turning to the relationship at hand, the Court explained:
The statements are in no way directed towards any person with whom appellant would
normally be in contact in the course of his daily work as a teacher.... Appellant's
employment relationships with the Board and, to a somewhat lesser extent, with the
superintendent are not the kind of close working relationships for which it can
1002
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2. Connick v. Myers
In Connick v. Myers," the Court expanded the Pickering analy-
sis into a full-fledged test.45  Sheila Myers, an Assistant District
Attorney, circulated a questionnaire to her fellow employees. She
distributed the questionnaire within the District Attorney's offices
during the workday6 she did so right after she refused her superior's
request to transfer to another office. 47 The questionnaire solicited
coworkers' views on their superiors and on morale in the office. One
question asked whether the employees felt any pressure to work on
political campaigns because of their public positions-pressure that
would have been unconstitutional.48 The District Attorney's Office
promptly fired Myers, stating that her questionnaire had the
potential to cause a serious decrease in morale at the office. 49 The
Office also stated that it viewed the questionnaire as a direct attack
on the capabilities of the Myers's superiors.50 Myers brought suit
under the First Amendment, alleging violation of her right to free
speech.
The Connick Court ruled for the government,5 1 and in so doing
it streamlined the Pickering factors into a two-part test for evaluating
public employee free speech. First, the Court stated, the speech in
persuasively be claimed that personal loyalty and confidence are necessary to their
proper functioning.
Id. at 569-70.
44. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
45. Three cases that dealt with this issue intervened between Pickering and Connick, but
none of these elaborated on the definition of "public concern." In Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S.
593 (1972), the Court reversed summary judgment where plaintiff the teacher claimed his
employer violated his first amendment rights by refusing to rehire him in retaliation for
unfavorable testimony before public agencies. Id. at 598. The Perry Court characterized
Pickering as holding that "a teacher's public criticism of his superiors on matters of public
concern may be constitutionally protected and may, therefore, be an impermissible basis for
termination of his employment." Id. See also Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) (holding that the plaintiff has the burden of proving that his
protected speech was a substantial reason for discipline imposed and that the employer must
then show it would have fired the employee without consideration of the protected speech);
Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415-16 (1979) (holding that a
public teacher's speech could not be denied protection under Pickering based only on the fact
that it was uttered in private to a superior).
46. Connick, 461 U.S. at 141.
47. Id. at 140-42
48. See id. at 155-56.
49. Id. at 141.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 154. This is the only time the Supreme Court has ruled for the defendant em-
ployer when evaluating an expost restriction on public employee free speech.
1997] 1003
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question must be evaluated to determine whether it is "of public con-
cern."52 If not, it is entirely unprotected and the employer may disci-
pline the employee uttering the speech without fear of first amend-
ment repercussions.53 If the speech is public concern speech, however,
the evaluating court must engage in a balancing test, weighing the
value of the speech against its potential for disruption of the
government workplace. 54  The degree of public concern becomes a
factor in this balance. Applying the test to the facts of the case, the
Connick Court found that Myers's questionnaire consisted entirely of
unprotected, non-public concern speech, except for the single question
about pressure to participate in public campaigns. 55 The Court then
held that the questionnaire's potential for disruption of the workplace
outweighed the first amendment value of that single question.56
The Connick test, though purporting to be a simple codification
of Pickering, arguably altered the Pickering analysis in two important
ways. First, unlike the Court in Pickering, the Connick Court empha-
sized "public concern" as a separate inquiry. Though the Pickering
Court did refer to speech upon matters of "public concern,"57 it never
clearly identified the degree of public concern necessary or even the
degree to be considered as a factor in weighing the "value" of the
speech in question. Second, the Connick Court emphasized disruption
of the workplace as the main concern behind regulation of public
employee speech.51 The Pickering Court had concentrated on
disruption of the relationship between fellow employees or between
employee and employer. 59 Such a disruption could of course reduce
the overall efficiency of the workplace, but only indirectly. The
52. Id. at 147.
53. Id. CWe hold only that when a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of
public concern, but instead as an employee upon matters only of personal interest, absent the
most unusual circumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the
wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the employee's
behavior.").
54. Id. at 150-51. The Court thus suggested that the value of the speech in question was
to be considered in both prongs of the test. The dissent criticized this "double-weighting." Id. at
157-58 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Scholars have also criticized consideration of the speech's
value at both stages of the Connick test. See, for example, Massaro, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 28
(cited in note 22); Lee, 76 Cal. L. Rev. at 1121 (cited in note 12).
55. Connick, 461 U.S. at 149. The District Attorney's Office itself appears to have consid-
ered this question to be one of public interest or concern; the Office stated that the question
would prove damaging if the media caught wind of it. Id. at 141.
56. Id. at 154.
57. See note 39 and accompanying text. See also Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571 CMore impor-
tantly, the question whether a school system requires additional funds is a matter of legitimate
public concern .... ).
58. See note 54 and accompanying text.
59. See note 43 and accompanying text.
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Pickering Court seemed more concerned with efficiency at a very
circumscribed level-between the speaker and the subject of the
speech.60
3. Waters v. Churchill
The Court's latest pronouncement in a Connick-type case 6'
came in 1994 with Waters v. Churchill.62 In Waters, Cheryl Churchill,
an obstetrics nurse at a public hospital, engaged in a private discus-
sion with a fellow employee. The conversation took place at the
workplace during a dinner break.63 Apparently,64 Churchill warned
the other worker that the obstetrics department was a bad place to
work.65  The hospital discharged Churchill because of her
conversation, and she brought suit under the First Amendment.66
The Waters Court engaged in a detailed analysis of the history
of public employee free speech.67 When it reached the actual applica-
tion of the PickeringlConnick test, however, it passed the threshold
public concern prong in a blur. The Court simply stated that "if
Churchill's criticism... was speech on a matter of public
concern-something we need not decide-the potential disruptiveness
of the speech as reported was enough to outweigh whatever first
60. Id. This concern is akin to the personal loyalty concerns the Court has addressed in
political patronage cases. Political patronage cases are cases in which the employer fires, hires,
or otherwise acts in response to its employees political activities. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S.
347, 353-55 (1976) (describing the patronage system). For example, an elected Republican
sheriff, upon entering office, will fire her deputies who are Democrats. In patronage cases, the
Court has allowed the additional interest of political loyalty to outweigh the employees' first
amendment interests in certain circumstances. See id. at 367-73. See also Branti v. Finkel, 445
U.S. 507, 517-18 (1980) (finding infringement upon first amendment rights of expression and
association to be justified when political loyalty is a work requirement such that an employee's
political sympathies will cause inefficiencies in the workplace).
61. A "Connick-type case" addresses an expost regulation of public employee speech. See
note 6. A 1995 Supreme Court case, United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 115
S. Ct. 1003, 130 L. Ed. 2d 964 (1995) C'NTEU'), also addressed public employee free speech and
imported most of the Connick analysis. However, NTEU was an ex ante case. Id. at 1008
(describing a challenge to statute, rather than a single employment decision). It is unclear
whether NTEU signals that the Court intends to develop one doctrine to cover all ex ante and ex
post cases.
62. 511 U.S. 661 (1994).
63. Id. at 664.
64. The actual content of the speech was a major point of contention. For a summary of
the different versions of the facts and an explanation of the Coures treatment of the issue, see
notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
65. Waters, 511 U.S. at 665.
66. Id. at 666-67.
67. Id. at 668-75.
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amendment value it might have had."68 This "skip" to the second
prong evidences the weakness of the threshold test as a protection for
the employee's speech. If the Court need not evaluate the content of
the speech, the first prong becomes only an exclusionary rule-an
easy way to eliminate an employee's first amendment claim. The
content of the speech can never shield the employee from employer
action.
Though Waters did nothing to clarify the Pickering/Connick
test, it did add something important to public employee free speech
jurisprudence: a procedural requirement. Central to the Waters
dispute was the question of what Churchill had actually said to the
other nurse.69 To solve what could be a recurring problem in this type
of case, the Waters Court established a framework for determining the
true content of the speech to be evaluated. The Court stated that it
would take as correct the content of the speech as determined by the
employer's "reasonable investigation."70
Some commentators have heralded this new development as a
boon to employees because it sets up the first procedural safeguard for
an employee's right to free speech.71 Before Waters, an employee could
challenge an employment decision based on speech only indirectly, by
marshaling the necessary resources to sue the employer after the fact.
Waters assists the employee by mandating an internal evaluation of
the speech-based employment decision before that decision becomes
final. This should allow the employee to vindicate her free speech
68. Id. at 680 (emphasis added).
69. Id. at 664. The employer claimed that Churchill had badmouthed her immediate
supervisor, Waters, and that she had warned the other nurse not to work in obstetrics. Id. at
665-66. Churchill claimed she had criticized staffing policies of another supervisor, but that she
had actually defended Waters and encouraged the other nurse to transfer into obstetrics. Id. at
666.
70. Id. at 667-68.
71. D. Keith Fortner, Note, Public Employers Must Conduct a Reasonable Investigation to
Determine if an Employee's Speech Is Protected Before Discharging the Employee Based Upon
the Speech, 18 U. Ark. Little Rock L. J. 463, 487-88 (1996) (expressing cautious optimism re-
garding Waters's procedural rights); Keith L. Sachs, Comment, Waters v. Churchill- Personal
Grievance or Protected Speech, Only a Reasonable Investigation Can Tell-The Termination of
At-Will Government Employees, 30 New Eng. L. Rev. 779, 781 (1996) (describing Waters's
"safeguard"). The Waters Court itself suggested this interpretation: "A speaker is more pro-
tected if she has two opportunities to be vindicated-first by the employer's investigation and
then by the jury-than just one." Waters, 511 U.S. at 670. But see Cynthia L. Estlund, Free
Speech and Due Process in the Workplace, 71 Ind. L. J. 101, 128 (1995) ("Waters v. Churchill
adds little or nothing to the First Amendment protection of at-will public employees."); Kermit
Roosevelt, The Costs of Agencies: Waters v. Churchill and the First Amendment in the
Administrative State, 106 Yale L. J. 1233, 1233 (1997) (citing criticisms of Waters and noting
that "[c]ertainly it is true that after Waters, government employers enjoy greater freedom in
terminating employees based on speech").
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rights without having to suffer a wrongful discharge and all its
attendant handicaps.7 2
Such praise is misplaced for several reasons. First, the proce-
dure established in Waters only preserves the content of the speech in
question for later evaluation by the Court. It does not restrict the
public employer's employment decision. In addition, the employee
may face an additional obstacle in court because of Waters: the Court
will now evaluate the employee's rights based on the employer's
account of what the employee said.73
The Waters Court also imposed no penalty on an employer who
fails to conduct an investigation into the content of the speech. Thus,
even if the procedure does benefit employees, it is an illusory benefit
easily avoided by the employer. The employer may want to avoid
creating a paper trail or identifying witnesses who could later injure
its chances in a lawsuit. The employer may therefore "take its
chances" on first proving the content of the employee's speech in court
rather than in an internal investigation.
Finally, the most detrimental aspect of the Waters requirement
is its oft-overlooked delegation of first amendment analysis to the
employer. The Waters Court required that the employer conduct a
"reasonable investigation" only if the employer thinks there is a
"substantial likelihood" that the employee's speech is protected in the
first place.74 This caveat is apparently meant to reduce the new
72. Cynthia Estlund details the obstacles faced by a discharged employee who wishes to
vindicate her first amendment rights:
Consider the hurdles that face an at-will public employee who has publicly criticized her
superiors' performance of their public duties, and who is subsequently fired. She may be
given no reason, or she may be told that her performance has been unsatisfactory. She
has no right to notice or documentation of the alleged inadequacies, or an opportunity to
refute the charges. If the employee believes that she was fired because of protected
speech, and if she can find a lawyer to represent her, she can file a lawsuit in which she
may attempt to prove-largely through the employer's documents and witnesses still
employed by the employer-that her speech was on a matter of public concern, that her
discharge was actually motivated by her speech, and that the speech was not unduly
disruptive. In the meantime the employee may be unemployed under circumstances
that may handicap her in getting another job.
Estlund, 71 Ind. L. J. at 127 (cited in note 71) (footnote omitted).
73. Although this "reasonableness" requirement may help some employees, there is no
evidence that before Waters, the employee's version of the speech in question was disfavored;
therefore, imposing a "reasonableness" requirement on the employer is no real gain for the
employee.
74. Waters, 511 U.S. at 677 ("If an employment action is based on what an employee sup-
posedly said, and a reasonable supervisor would recognize that there is a substantial likelihood
that what was actually said was protected, the manager must tread with a certain amount of
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procedural requirement's burden on the employer. In light of the
vagueness and unpredictability of the Pickering/Connick test, how-
ever, it seems fantastic that the Court would give the employer, an
inherently biased party, the power to make an initial determination of
the test's result.75 It is also unclear whether, if the employer does not
find such a "substantial likelihood" of protection, the Court will
review the subsequent employment decision. If the answer to this
last question is no, Waters effectively renders the employer the final
arbiter of the employee's first amendment rights.
C. Finishing the Job: The Definition of Public Concern
1. Uncertainty Reigns Supreme
Though the Supreme Court in Pickering and Connick estab-
lished a new first amendment test to cover public employee free
speech, it failed to define a key element of that test: public concern.
This has led to great confusion among the lower courts. 76 In seeking
to apply the Pickering/Connick test, the lower courts engage in
convoluted factor analysis schemes to determine what speech is of
"public concern." These analyses often yield contradictory results77
that strip the public concern prong of all predictability and leave both
public employers and public employees uncertain of their rights. The
uncertainty is exacerbated by the ex post nature of the Court's
protection78 and can lead to a "chilling" effect on protected speech.79
care."). The dissent addressed this strange requirement, pointing out that the Court provided
no boundaries for the initial burden on the employer. Id. at 688-89 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
75. This framework may also raise separation-of-powers concerns. If this initial as-
sessment of the value of the speech in question can be considered a determination of the scope of
protection of the First Amendment, delegating that assessment to a member of the executive or
legislative branch could at least seemingly usurp the judiciary's power as the final arbiter of the
Constitution.
76. Stephen Allred, From Connick to Confusion: The Struggle to Define Speech on Matters
of Public Concern, 64 Ind. L. J. 43, 75 (1988) (lamenting that lower courts have been "anything
but consistent' in determining the scope of protection under Connick because of the "unbridled
discretion" the Connick Court authorized).
77. Id. ("Although broad categories of cases can be identified, there exist contradictions
within every category...."). Compare, for example, Johnson v. Lincoln University of the
Commonwealth System of Higher Educ., 776 F.2d 443, 454 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding an academic's
criticism of his university's president "public concern" speech), with Landrum v. Eastern
Kentucky University, 578 F. Supp. 241, 246-47 (E.D. Ky. 1984) (holding an academic's criticism
of his dean not to be "public concern" speech). Both cases are described in Allred, 64 Ind. L. J.
at 65-66 (cited in note 76).
78. See note 6 and accompanying text. The employee must suffer termination because of
her speech before establishing her right to speak. Further, the remedy for an unconstitutional
termination may simply be reinstatement, a remedy that often proves remarkably unsuccessful.
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After Waters, predictability may be at an even higher premium. If
Waters delegates the initial responsibility for evaluating first
amendment protection to the employer itself, the Court must provide
the employer with a crystal-clear threshold test to determine when
speech is of "public concern" and therefore possibly protected. The
employer is certainly not equipped to evaluate the lower courts' com-
plicated factor-analysis schemes.
2. Defining the Problem: Double-Stranded Analysis
Clearing up the Connick confusion requires a close look at the
clues the Court has provided regarding the definition of the public
concern threshold test. Piecing together the Court's dicta on "public
concern" reveals two types of analysis occurring simultaneously
during the Pickering/Connick threshold test: a content-based analysis
and a context-based analysis.80 The former concentrates on what was
said, while the latter concerns where, when, and to whom the speech
was uttered. A quick revisitation of the main public employee free
speech cases establishes the simultaneous existence of both
evaluations.
See Paul C. Weiler, Governing the Workplace: The Future of Labor and Employment Law 85-87
(Harvard U., 1990) (asserting that reinstatement causes severe difficulties between the
reinstated employee and the successfully-sued employer). See also id. at 86 (quoting the
"success rate"-the percentage of employees who continue in their employment for any length of
time after reinstatement-for private, non-organized employees at only 10%).
79. See generally Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling
the "Chilling Effect", 58 B.U. L. Rev. 685 (1978) (describing the importance of such a chilling
effect in the Coures free speech jurisprudence). The government has actually documented this
effect in analyzing the efficacy of existing whistleblowing statutes. See U.S. Merit Systems
Protection Board, Whistleblowing in the Federal Government. An Update (U.S. G.P.O., 1993),
discussed in Estlund, 71 Ind. L. J. at 119-21 (cited in note 71). If employees are afraid to speak
even when protected by federal regulations preventing their discharge for certain types of
speech, they will be even less willing to speak when only protected by an unpredictable,
undefined, expost judicial analysis.
80. This content/context distinction may be causing confusion in other areas of first
amendment jurisprudence as well. See Michael J. Mannheimer, Note, The Fighting Words
Doctrine, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 1527 (1993) (arguing that the Courts "fighting words" jurisprudence
may confuse content with context).
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a. Pickering
The Pickering Court spent much of its opinion evaluating the
content of the plaintiff employee's speech.81 In basing its holding on
"[tlhe public interest in having free and unhindered debate on matters
of public importance,"8 2 the Court evaluated the truthfulness of
Pickering's accusations and their value to the public. Thus the
content of the speech was a primary concern for the Court.
Pickering, however, also provides support for a context-based
test because of its emphasis on the speaker's rights as a citizen. The
Court, when striking a balance between employee and employer,
stated that the relevant interests of the speaker were those impli-
cated when the employer was speaking "as a citizen, in commenting
upon matters of public concern."83 Thus it seems that public concern,
even if intended as a subject matter test, originally had to be coupled
with an evaluation of whether the speaker was speaking as a citizen.
The identity of the speaker feasibly cannot change according to the
content of her speech, but it is plausible that the identity of the
speaker "changes" based on where and when the speaker is speaking.
When a teacher speaks within the workplace, during the workday,
she speaks as a teacher and thus her identity as "employee"
dominates. When she speaks outside that scope, however, she speaks
as a citizen.
The Pickering Court provided additional support for a context-
based analysis by describing the case before it as one "in which a
teacher has made erroneous public statements upon issues then cur-
rently the subject of public attention."84 This statement, though
clearly dicta, shows that the Court considered where the speaker was
speaking to be an important part of its analysis. Because of this
implied emphasis on the context of the speech, it seems appropriate to
label the Pickering Court's analysis of public concern a purely content-
based analysis.
b. Clues Since Pickering
In Connick, the Court explicitly incorporated both a content-
based and a context-based analysis of public concern, stating that
"content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the
81. 391 U.S. at 570-72.
82. Id. at 573.
83. Id. at 568.
84. Id. at 572 (emphasis added).
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whole record"85 determine whether the speech in question will be
protected. In determining that Myers's speech was not of public
concern, the Court emphasized the fact that Myers did not attempt to
inform the public of issues concerning the District Attorney's
activities of investigation and prosecution or of the office's miscarriage
of official duties.8 6 The Court also stated that "[e]mployee speech
which transpires entirely on the employee's own time, and in nonwork
areas of the office, bring[s] different factors into the Pickering
calculus, and might lead to a different conclusion."87 Thus, the Court
was concerned with the context of the speech as well as its content; if
the speech had been aimed at the public, outside the workplace and in
a traditional public forum, it would have come closer to being public
concern speech.
Waters gives strong support to a content-based analysis of
public concern: the entire case concentrates on defining the content of
the speech in question as a prerequisite to applying the
Pickering/Connick test. In fact, Waters could be read as a mandate to
apply a pure content-based analysis under the public concern prong.
Despite Waters, however, the content/context confusion seems to have
survived. The Court's latest word in United States v. National
Treasury Employees Union ("NTEU")8 again mixes content-based and
context-based concerns. The NTEU Court stated that the speech at
issue was public concern speech because it was "addressed to a public
audience, [was] made outside the workplace, and involved content
largely unrelated to [the plaintiffs'] employment."8 9
Thus, analysis of Supreme Court precedent provides evidence
of two strands of public concern analysis: content-based and context-
based. This Note suggests that the content-based strand of public
concern analysis is fatally flawed. A content-based analysis creates
doctrinal problems within first amendment jurisprudence and fails to
draw the correct line between protected versus non-protected speech.
The Court should thus refocus on the context-based strand and use
that strand alone to clearly define "public concern."
85. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48 (emphasis added).
86. Id. at 148.
87. Id. at 153 n.13.
88. 115 S. Ct. 1003, 130 L. Ed. 2d 964 (1995).
89. 115 S. Ct. at 1013.
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III. PROBLEMS WITH A CONTENT-BASED ANALYSIS OF "PUBLIC
CONCERN"
A. Problems of Application: Learnability
Categorical first amendment tests create many dangers of
misapplication.90 One measure of the projected efficacy of first
amendment categorizations is "learnability":91 whether the judiciary
can be successfully "taught" how to determine whether speech falls
inside or outside an established category.92 If a category is not lear-
nable, it will result in unfathomable analysis, which leads to unpre-
dictable opinions and uncertain rights.93
The Supreme Court itself expressed doubt as to the learn-
ability of a content-based public concern category by establishing and
then overruling a content-based public concern test for defamation
cases in the 1970s. 94 In 1971, in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,9 5 a
three-member plurality of the Court extended protection for media
defendants to "all discussion and communication involving matters of
public or general concern."96 The Court proceeded to define public
concern based solely on the content of the speech in question.97 Only
three years later, however, a full majority explicitly rejected the
Rosenbloom standard and overruled the decision, stating that the
public concern test "would occasion the additional difficulty of forcing
state and federal judges to decide on an ad hoc basis which publica-
tions address issues of 'general or public interest' and which do not."8
Thus, the Court was concerned with the learnability of a content-
based public concern test.
The Court later reinjected content-based public concern
analysis into its defamation jurisprudence based on Connick and in
90. Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34
Vand. L. Rev. 265, 265-66 (1981).
91. Id. at 305.
92. Id. at 305-07.
93. Id.
94. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Speech on Matters of Public Concern. The Perils of an
Emerging First Amendment Category, 59 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1, 4-13 (1990) (describing the
Courts first foray into categorization of public concern).
95. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
96. Id. at 44.
97. Id.
98. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974) (quoting Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at
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apparent disregard for its own proclamation.99 The Court's self-
criticism, however, must still hold true. A judge cannot feasibly
"learn" what is of public concern if the category is defined by the
actual content of the speech; there is nowhere to turn for a definition
of which issues concern the public. The Court could perhaps look to
the media's newsworthiness determinationsoo as a guide to public
concern issues. Yet basing public concern on media proclamations
strips the actual "public" of the power to determine what speech is of
concern and delegates that power to an entity whose concerns do not
necessarily reflect those of the whole public.101 It also creates an ever-
changing definition of public concern-what is news today may not be
news tomorrow, nor may it be news somewhere else-that further
decreases the predictability of the public concern test.102
99. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985) (quoting
the Coures determination in Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48, that "[w]hether ... speech addresses
a matter of public concern must be determined by [the expression's], content, form, and
context ... as revealed by the whole record").
100. The Gertz Court would, of course, disagree with this approach since the Coures
concern was that the judiciary could not determine which of a media defendant's publications
addressed issues of public concern. See notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
Several lower courts have considered newsworthiness a proper factor in evaluating the first
prong of the Pickering/Connick test. For brief opinions on whether newsworthiness is a proper
measure of public concern, compare Christine M. Arden, Note, Public Employees and the First
Amendment- Connick v. Myers, 15 Loyola U. Chi. L. J. 293, 307 (1984) (yes), with Robert M.
Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Nomos and Narrative, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 172 n.65
(1983) (no).
101. Several critics have furthered the view that the mass media has distinct political
leanings itself and ultimately may be hostile to certain viewpoints. See, for example, Steven
Shiffrin, The Politics of the Mass Media and the Free Speech Principle, 69 Ind. L. J. 689, 694-713
(1994) (arguing that the media as a commercial entity is inherently biased towards a conserva-
tive, pro-status quo viewpoint to the detriment of "liberal" concerns); Frederick Schauer, The
Political Incidence of the Free Speech Principle, 64 U. Colo. L. Rev. 935 (1993) (examining the
politics of the media). The media may also be an imperfect vehicle for change. See Steven
Shiffrin, Defamatory Non-Media Speech and First Amendment Methodology, 25 UCLA L. Rev.
915, 979 (1978) ('Only in changing people's existing conceptions-the normal goal of the critics
of the status quo-does the media falter."). If so, it cannot serve as an indicator of the "most
important" viewpoints: those that can correct existing problems or bring about possible im-
provements. For the view that the First Amendment places a premium on the ability to change
our government and social structure, see notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
102. The Court seems to have succumbed to this phenomenon at least in part. In Rankin v.
McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987), an employee, in response to the assassination attempt on
President Reagan, said "[i]f they go for him again, I hope they get him." Id. at 380. The Court
found the employee's speech was of public concern, reasoning that "[t]he statement was made in
the course of a conversation addressing the policies of the President's administration. It came
on the heels of a news bulletin regarding what is certainly a matter of heightened public atten-
tion: an attempt on the life of the President." Id. at 386. The latter phrase disturbingly implies
that the fact that the President's life was in a brighter spotlight that day may have been an
important factor in determining the amount of protection to afford under the First Amendment.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
The problem of learnability is exacerbated by Waters. After
Waters, the employer must make an initial determination of the value
of the employee's speech, a determination that may never be reviewed
by the courts. 10 3 If the Court is not equipped to determine what issues
are of "public concern," certainly the employer, an interested party, is
at an even greater disadvantage.
B. Doctrinal Problems with "Public Concern" as Conceived by the
Pickering and Connick Courts
Besides the practical problems of predictability and learnabil-
ity, which impact primarily on the individual plaintiff, a content-
based public concern analysis poses theoretical problems for first
amendment jurisprudence as a whole. Most scholars agree that the
First Amendment functions primarily to inform the public, which can
in turn check abuses of power and move our government ever closer to
an ideal system.14 This function is even more important in the public
employment context because employees are an important conduit of
information for the public about the public workplace.105 Moving the
government towards a more efficient and normatively better state
necessarily requires change from time to time. Thus, the First
Amendment should allow and even promote change in the
government workplace.1°6
If public concern is a content-based test, however, protecting
"public concern" speech will not promote change. In Pickering, the
Court stated that the teacher's protected comments were "public
statements upon issues then currently the subject of public atten-
103. See Part II.B.3. See also Edward J. Velazquez, Comment, Waters v. Churchill
Government-Employer Efficiency, Judicial Deference, and the Abandonment of Public-Employee
Free Speech by the Supreme Court, 61 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1005, 1058 (1995) (warning that "Waters
indicated the Court has abandoned a genuine judicial review" of public employee free speech
cases).
104. Free speech ensures that the electorate is informed and therefore able to shape our
government properly. See, for example, Meiklejohn, Political Freedom at 26 (cited in note 16);
id. at 42 (asserting that the First Amendment "offers defense to men who plan and advocate and
incite toward corporate action for the common good"); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673
(1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting) C'Every idea is an incitement. It offers itself for belief and if
believed it is acted on...."). See also Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment
Theory, 1977 Am. Bar Found. Res. J. 523, 524 (1977) (stating that first amendment claims in
the 1960s and 1970s were often claims about the power to "unleash latent social forces" for
change).
105. See notes 115-19 and accompanying text.
106. See, for example, Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) ("The protection
given speech and press was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing
about of political and social changes desired by the people." (emphasis added)).
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tion."107 This definition of "public concern" speech suggests that only
speech that reflects issues already spoken about and debated deserves
protection. The language in Pickering implies that only "redundant"
speech is to be recognized. Therefore, speech that first grabs "the
public attention," and thereby begins to effect a change, is of lesser
value because it occurs before that attention is focused. This result is
in tension with the change-forcing function of the First Amendment.
Further, it is unclear how much of the "public" needs to be
interested before the speech becomes public concern speech under a
content-based analysis. All speech is the subject of attention for at
least one member of the public-the employee speaker. Yet the
employee's interest is obviously not enough to ensure protection.108 By
ignoring this concern in favor of the "larger" public, a content-based
public concern analysis threatens to inject majoritarian values into
first amendment jurisprudence. 109 Such an intrusion is inimical to the
countermajoritarian function of the Bill of Rights. 1" 0
And finally, if speech is only of public concern when it concerns
a large, ongoing debate, there seems to be an inherent contradiction
with the second prong of the public employee free speech test. Such
speech, if it relates to the workplace, may be inherently disruptive.,,
107. 391 U.S. at 572 (emphasis added).
108. For thoughts on why this is problematic, see Estlund, 59 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 31
(cited in note 94). Professor Estlund notes that most so-called "public" issues at the forefront of
our consciousness today-AIDS, drug abuse, etc.-began as purely private issues concerning
those individuals personally grappling with such issues. Id.
109. See Massaro, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 31 (cited in note 22) (To infuse majoritarian values
into the Bill of Rights and conclude that protected employee speech must involve matters that
are already of interest to a significant segment of the public seems a very wrong reading of the
first amendment.").
110. Judge Bork has argued that our government is based on a Madisonian model of
majoritarian democracy, but with some areas-those designated in the Bill of Rights-reserved
for countermajoritarian individual freedoms. In these areas, including first amendment
jurisprudence, "coercion by the majority.. . is tyranny." Bork, 47 Ind. L. J. at 2-3. (cited in note
16). See also Massaro, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 31 (cited in note 22). This is logical in light of the
First Amendments core value of promoting informed participation in government to enable the
electorate to bring about needed change. See notes 104-06 and accompanying text. Further,
minority views are necessary to provide an alternative to the status quo. See Meiklejohn,
Political Freedom at 42 (cited in note 16) (contending that free speech ensures that beliefs are
offered for consideration by the majority); Roth, 354 U.S. at 484 (stating that the First
Amendment protects "even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion"). See also
Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 489-90 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
Court's designation of the "social value" of speech as a majority value, ignoring minority
concerns).
111. See Massaro, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 23-24 (cited in note 22) ("[The decisions encourage
workers to carry their grievances to outside fora-to newspaper, public meetings, television, or
other similar avenues-even though publicity could fan into flames an ember that might have
been doused quickly and quietly within the workplace."). Professor Estlund notes that
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Thus, if speech passes the threshold test of public concern, it may
automatically fail the disruption prong. 12
C. The Paradox of Content Analysis in the Public Employment Setting
By focusing on content to identify public concern speech, the
Court recently ensnared itself in a paradox. In NTEU, the Court
stated that the speech in question was public concern speech because
(in addition to context-based reasons), the speech "involved content
largely unrelated to [the plaintiffs'] government employment."113 This
conclusion echoes many lower courts' evaluations of the strength of
the nexus between the subject of the speech and the workplace;
speech that relates less directly to employment duties is more likely
to be of public concern."4 This nexus, however, undermines a major
rationale behind protection of employees' speech: the public's need for
information about the workplace.
The Pickering Court recognized that public employee free
speech furthers public interests as well as employee concerns.115 The
public benefits from employee speech because the public employee is
in the best position to inform the public of potential problems within
whistleblower statutes" have created a similar paradox in the private workplace. The
government needs whistleblowers to enforce workplace regulations, but whistleblowing speech
is inherently disruptive. Therefore, the government has passed legislation to protect the
employee from repercussions for this speech. Estlund, 71 Ind. L. Rev. at 116 (cited in note 29)
(discussing federal and state statutes that provide extra-constitutional protection to private
employee speech on certain subjects). Some whistleblowing statutes regulate public workplaces
as well. See, for example, 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) (1994 ed.) (prohibiting federal employers under
certain circumstances from basing employment decisions on an employee's or applicanfs
disclosure of the employer's illegal or inappropriate activities). However, government
employees arguably are even more valuable than their private counterparts as sources of
information about all aspects of the government workplace-not only those covered by current
regulations-are of interest to the voting public. Thus, government employees should enjoy
protection for more of their speech than is covered by whistleblower statutes.
112. See Massaro, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 23-24 (cited in note 22) (describing the
"disconcerting' paradox confronting an employee who must "stir things up" to satisfy the public
concern requirement but who then risks failing the disruption prong).
113. 115 S. Ct. at 1013.
114. See Allred, 64 Ind. L. J. at 72-75 & n.209 (cited in note 76) (labeling such matters "of
purely personal interest').
115. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572 (noting that public school teachers are "most likely to have
informed and definite opinions" regarding the tax issue that Pickering's letter addressed and
that therefore "it is essential that [teachers] be able to speak out freely" to inform community
debate). See also Developments, 97 Harv. L. Rev. at 1739 (cited in note 12) (stating that free
speech jurisprudence in the 1960s was characterized by an increasing emphasis on the public's
concerns). This recognition is problematic; it bypasses the original emphasis on the First
Amendment as an entirely personal right in favor of protection for the effects of the exercise of
that right. Such a shift transforms an individual right into a societal right, and it could
eventually render individual rights completely relative, affected by changes in the societal
milieu.
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the workplace.116 Indeed, such public-informing speech furthers the
goal of efficiency, which is the primary counterbalance to the First
Amendment within the workplace. 117 Because the public employer
must remain efficient not for itself by way of profit, but for the public,
the danger always exists that the employer will lose incentive to
maintain efficiency. It must therefore be constantly monitored by the
real "boss"-the public. Though statutes like the Freedom of
Information Actls have increased the public's ability to obtain infor-
mation about internal workings of government, public employees
remain the best and quickest source of information: the employee
informs the public, which in turn pushes for more efficient admini-
stration of the workplace.119 Thus, speech relating directly to em-
ployment is more "valuable" to society as a whole than speech with no
relation to public employment.
Because of the empl6yee's vital function as information gath-
erer, any test that protects speech to a lesser degree because it con-
cerns the workplace has no place in public employment free speech
doctrine. If anything, the stronger the relationship between the con-
tent of the employee's speech and the public employment, the greater
should be the protection for the speech. A content-based public conc-
ern analysis like that implied in NTEU negates the public's interest
in public employee speech about the workplace.
116. See Blasi, 1977 Am. Bar Found. Res. J. at 527 (cited in note 104) (describing the
evolution of free speech theory to include a central "checking value": the individual can check
the abuse of power by public officials by her speech).
117. See Patricia C. Camvel, Note, Waters v. Churchill- The Denial of Public Employees'
First Amendment Rights, 4 Widener J. Pub. L. 581, 609-15 (1995) (arguing that Waters and its
predecessors impose inefficiencies on the workplace because of their chilling effect).
118. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994 ed.) (requiring agencies to release
records upon public inquiry).
119. The government itself relies on this effect to enforce regulations within the private
workplace. See Weiler, Governing the Workplace at 157-58 (cited in note 78) (noting the
important role employees play in bringing regulatory violations to light). The employee's
function as information-gatherer has become increasingly important because appointed officials
and executive agencies are becoming more influential in setting government policies. See
Gerald E. Fung, Does the Constitution Prevent the Discharge of Civil Service Employees?, 124 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 942, 943 (1976) (noting the trend to make "government the pivotal force in the
development of American society" over twenty years ago); Cornelius N. Kerwin, Rulemaking:
How Government Agencies Write Law and Make Policy (CQ Press, 1994). Now the public
employee is a source of information regarding not only economic inefficiencies, but also
improper policymaking.
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D. Larger Repercussions: The Specter of an Impotent
First Amendment
A content-based public concern test may even pose real dan-
gers to the First Amendment itself. Professor Cynthia Estlund has
warned that a content-based definition of public concern speech turns
first amendment jurisprudence on its head. 120  She points out that
public concern speech has always been at the heart of first amend-
ment protection.12' Even scholars who disagree with Alexander
Meiklejohn's vehement argument that "the First Amendment is an
absolute"' 22 admit that the phrase applies to speech about public mat-
ters.1 23 As noted above,' 24 in the past the Court has always provided
protection to speech on matters of "public concern," carving out
narrow exceptions. 125 Instead of again prescribing exceptions to the
general rule of protection, the Court in Connick switched the
presumption from protection to non-protection. 126 Thus, the doctrine
forces the speaker to prove that he or she should be protected rather
than making the government prove that it should be allowed to
infringe upon the speech. The First Amendment becomes a license to
abridge freedom of speech unless the speaker can prove his or her
speech is of public concern.
This switch is more sinister than a simple shifting of burdens.
Without a default of absolute protection for speech, the First
Amendment dwindles to nothing more than a reminder for the Court
to consider the value of speech when weighing competing concerns of
the individual and the state. The Free Speech Clause ceases to hold a
central place in our constitutional value scheme 127 and becomes just
120. Estlund, 59 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 48 (cited in note 94) ("The creation of a category of
speech on matters of public concern-a core category within the sphere of protected speech,
which alone is entitled to certain protections--turns [established first amendment jurispru-
dence] inside out").
121. Id. at 2-3. In all areas of first amendment jurisprudence, Professor Estlund equates
"public concern" speech with what other scholars call political speech.
122. See Meiklejohn, 1961 S. Ct. Rev. at 245 (cited in note 16).
123. See, for example, Bork, 47 Ind. L. J. at 20 (cited in note 16) (asserting that only politi-
cal speech-which Professor Estlund equates with public concern speech-deserves protection
under the First Amendment).
124. See note 102 and accompanying text.
125. Estlund, 59 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 47-49 (cited in note 94) (describing the Courts
perpetual scheme of protection for the "core category" of "public concern" speech under the First
Amendment).
126. See notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
127. See Laurent B. Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 Yale L. J. 1424, 1442-
43 (1962). This Author subscribes to Professor Schauer's view that free speech should be
treated as one of the highest ranking "principles" in our governmental scheme, along with
[Vol. 50:9931018
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another "factor" in balancing the rights of the individual against the
power of the government. Such an approach could eventually weaken
the force of the First Amendment in other areas as well. 128
IV. A NEW PROPOSAL FOR PUBLic EMPLOYEE FREE SPEECH
Concern over public concern doctrine is not new. Since the
Court's initial definition in Pickering, scholars have struggled to de-
fine "public concern," suggesting interpretations of the test that fit the
Court's rationales and existing first amendment jurisprudence. 129
These redefinitions, however, have all preserved a content-based
strand of public concern.
This Note proposes eliminating that strand in favor of a pure
context-based analysis. If the Court insists on preserving the thresh-
old public concern test,130 it should recast the test to focus on the
equality, liberty, democracy, and public interest. See Frederick F. Schauer, Free Speech: A
Philosophical Enquiry (Cambridge U., 1982).
128. See Estlund, 59 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 48-50 (cited in note 94) (worrying that the
Court will export the public concern test to other areas of the First Amendment).
As discussed above, the Court has already bootstrapped the "public concern" inquiry back
into defamation jurisprudence, from which it was previously explicitly rejected. See notes 94-99
and accompanying text. For an example of its exportability to freedom of association cases, see
Mark Strauss, Note, Public Employees' Freedom of Association: Should Connick v. Myers'
Speech-Based Public-Concern Rule Apply?, 61 Fordham L. Rev. 473 (1992). Mr. Strauss agrees
with Professor Estlund that there is danger that the public concern doctrine will bleed into all
areas of first amendment doctrine. Id. at 493. He divides freedom of association cases into two
subcategories-expressive association and intimate association-and argues that applying
Connick to the freedom of expressive association is already a mandatory corollary to Connick.
Id. at 493. Mr. Strauss believes that Connick should not be applied to cases involving freedom
of intimate association, but he provides no assurances that Connick will not eventually enter
that realm as well. Id. at 488-89. See also Estlund, 59 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 27 (cited in note
94) (waring that public forum doctrine is "vulnerable to the allure of the public concern tese').
129. See Massaro, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 1 (cited in note 22). Professor Massaro suggests
eliminating the distinction between public and private concern speech altogether in favor of a
"street discourse" test: if the speech is permissible street corner discourse, the government
should not be allowed to regulate it. Id. at 67. This suggestion does not, however, confine itself
to the public workplace, and thus its broad-brush categorization might have serious and possibly
detrimental impacts on other areas of first amendment jurisprudence. See also Lee, 76 Cal. L.
Rev. at 1136-46 (cited in note 12) (proposing a reversal of the Pickering/Connick prongs that
would afford primary importance to disruption in the workplace and suggesting several factors
that would shield a disruptive speaker from regulations, all of which help distinguish a "citizen"
speaker from a noncitizen); Allred, 64 Ind. L. J. at 75-81 (cited in note 76) (evaluating three
approaches within the existing framework of public concern analysis).
130. This Note proposes to redefine the public concern test. There is an equally strong ar-
gument, however, for eliminating the threshold evaluation altogether. Because the Court has
decreased its emphasis on the first prong since Connick, see note 68 and accompanying text, and
because the original concern of the Court regarding public employee speech was its disruptive
effect, the public concern prong seems unnecessary.
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distinction between workplace speech and speech outside the working
environment. This distinction can be best described by analogy to the
"scope of employment" test currently used in both agency and
employment law.
Further, the burden for meeting the threshold test should be
reversed and the effect of the finding of public concern should be
modified. If the speech is of public concern, it deserves full and
absolute protection. If it is not of public concern, it should still be
evaluated under the second prong of the Pickering/ Connick test: the
Court should weigh the speech's "value" against its potential for
disruption. Speech outside the scope of employment should thereby
receive full protection, while speech within the scope of employment
may be subjected to the balancing test currently embodied in the
second prong of the Pickering/Connick test.
A. The "Scope of Employment" Test
The common-law agency test for "scope of employment" in-
volves three determinations: whether the conduct in question is
within the type of duties the employer authorized the employee to
perform; whether the conduct was carried out within the time and
space limits the employer authorized; and whether the conduct de-
rived, at least in part, from an intent to serve the employer.131 Under
the common-law test, if the answer to both the first and the second
inquiries is yes, an inference arises that the conduct in question was
actuated, at least in part, by the intent or purpose to serve the em-
ployer.132
This test would translate easily to the public employee free
speech setting. The "conduct" evaluated under the test would be not
the speech in question, but the employee's conduct when she uttered
the speech. This would avoid further content/context confusion.133
The employer would first have to show that the employee spoke while
carrying out conduct authorized by the employer, and that she was
speaking on the employer's time within the confines of the workplace.
This would create an inference that the employee spoke within her
131. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 228 (1958). See also Robert A. Kreiss, Scope of
Employment and Being an Employee Under the Work-Made-for-Hire Provision of the Copyright
Law: Applying the Common-Law Agency Tests, 40 U. Kan. L. Rev. 119, 128 (1991) (restating the
test as the courts have applied it).
132. Kreiss, 40 U. Kan. L. Rev. at 128-29 (cited in note 131).
133. Because an employer does not usually hire an employee to speak in certain ways,
there appears to be no theoretical problem with preserving the literal meaning of "conduce' as
the acts of the employee rather than the content of her speech.
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scope of employment and that her speech was thus regulable. The
employee would then shoulder the burden of proving that her conduct
at the time she spoke was not designed to aid the employer. 14
Defining protection for public employee free speech according
to the scope of employment test focuses the inquiry on the relation-
ship between the employee and the employer rather than on the
speech and the employer. This relationship has always been the key
to public employee free speech jurisprudence.135 Recall that originally,
the public employee's identity as an employee deprived her of all
constitutional rights.136 After the demise of the rights/privilege
doctrine, a public employee was no longer deprived of her rights
simply because of her status as "employee."137 Although her rights
could still be infringed in some instances, those instances were based
on the capacity within which she was acting-on whether she was
acting as an employee. Thus, the public employer's ability to regulate
employee speech should relate to the relationship that exists when
the employee speaks. When an employee speaks within the
employment relationship, her role within that relationship as
"employee" subjects her to the amount of control necessary for the
government, in its role as "employer," to maintain efficiency. Outside
the employment relationship, however, the employee has no role as
"employee"; therefore, she cannot be subject to the control of any
"employer." The employment relationship is both the genesis of and
the limitation on the government's ability to control the public
employee's speech. A test that allows for regulation only within the
employment relationship best maintains the employee's separate
134. At this point, a problem not normally encountered during the shifting of burdens may
arise. The third prong of the common-law test is a subjective one, necessitating evaluation of
the employee's motives in acting. Professor Kreiss points out that normally, the scope of
employment test is applied to determine whether the employer is responsible for acts of the
employee. A third party seeking to hold the employer liable for the acts of its employee will
invoke the scope of employment text. Because in this situation the employee also has a stake in
showing she was acting within the scope of employment to avoid personal liability, she will
normally testify that she was acting to aid the employer. This willingness to fulfill the test
alleviates the subjective nature of the third prong. Kreiss, 40 Kan. L. Rev. 119, 129-30 (cited in
note 131). Under the proposed test in the public employee free speech context, the employee
will have an interest in proving she acted outside the scope of employment in order to gain full
protection for her speech. An employee confronting the inferences raised by her employer under
the first two prongs of the test will seek to rebut that inference. This may reduce the teses
efficacy by creating difficult conflicts of proof.
135. See note 43 and accompanying text.
136. See notes 12-21 and accompanying text.
137. See notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
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identity as a citizen of the United States who is entitled to her
constitutional rights.
The Pickering Court specifically recognized this difference
between regulation based on status and regulation based on the ca-
pacity or role in which the employee is acting at the time of her
speech. By stating that an employee "as a citizen" is entitled to
certain rights that may not be present otherwise, the Pickering Court
implied that the public employee is entitled to her full first
amendment rights whenever she is not actually speaking within the
bounds of the employment relationship.13
The scope of employment test neatly defines the boundaries of
the employment relationship.139 Further, the scope of employment
test was designed to define when an employee is under the control of
the employer and therefore answerable to the employer.140
Application of the test to public employee free speech cases ensures
that the government employer will only have speech control over the
employee to the extent that the employee is answerable to her
employer for other aspects of the employment relationship. When the
employer is liable for the employee's actions, it can also regulate the
employee's speech.
In the public employee free speech context, the difference
between the proposed scope of employment test and the public conc-
ern analysis is best shown by an example. Imagine that the Court is
confronted with the following case: an employee stated "my boss is
driving me crazy, I can't stand working for her anymore." The em-
ployee was speaking to an old high school friend after hours at a mall,
and happened to be within earshot of a coworker. The employer
learned of the offensive statement and fired the employee. Under the
current content- and context-based public concern analysis, the Court
would first evaluate whether speech was of public concern. Even if
the test took into account the fact that the speech was uttered outside
the workplace, on the employee's own time, and to a person unin-
volved in the employment relationship, the employee's statement
would likely fail to pass the public concern threshold because it con-
cerns a personal grievance, a type of speech the Court has long re-
fused to afford protection.141 The Court reasons that no one other
138. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
139. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 228, cmt. a.
140. See Kreiss, 40 U. Kan. L. Rev. at 133-34 (cited in note 131).
141. See Allred, 64 Ind. L. J. at 73-74 (cited in note 76) (describing personal grievance cases
and stating that "[p]erhaps the most frequent reason cited by the courts for finding speech
outside the ambit of Connick is that the speech arose as part of a grievance").
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than the employee is concerned about the employee's personal opinion
regarding his boss. Thus, the Court would likely find the speech not
of public concern because of its content.
Under a scope of employment test, however, the outcome
would be completely different. A court would most likely find that the
speech was (1) spoken during conduct that was not authorized by the
employer (a private meeting with a friend), and (2) spoken outside of
authorized time and space (after hours at the mall). A court also
would most likely find that the employee did not intend to aid the em-
ployer by meeting with a friend at the mall after hours. The speech
would therefore be outside the scope of employment and fully pro-
tected as public concern speech.
The suggested change regarding the effect of the public conc-
ern test is illustrated by a slightly different example. Suppose the
employee utters the same phrase ("my boss is driving me crazy..."),
but now she speaks during the workday to a coworker while standing
in the employees' locker room. Under the current content-based
public concern analysis, the speech is, of course, not of public concern
and, therefore, still completely unprotected. Under the scope of em-
ployment test, the speech is most likely not of public concern as well.
However, the employee is not automatically denied relief if she is
discharged because of her comment. Instead, she has the chance to
prove that her offhand remark could cause no actual disruption of her
workplace. Such a showing would make no difference whatsoever
under the current free speech framework.
B. Reasons to Prefer the New Proposal Over the Current Approach
The proposed redefinition of the public concern test gives much
greater protection to public employee speech than the current applica-
tion of Pickering/Connick public concern analysis. As demonstrated
by the previous examples, the threshold test is dispositive for the
employee rather than for the employer. This difference affects the
parties mainly at the summary judgment stage. Under the current
definition, if the speech is not of public concern, the court must decide
the case for the employer. Under the new proposal, however, if the
speech is not of public concern, the Court may decide the case for the
employee. The redefinition creates a decidedly different initial
balance of power that provides a counterbalance to the inherent
resource advantages of the public employer during litigation. This
hopefully would deter employers from firing employees on the basis of
1023
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
questionable speech and thus reduce chilling by encouraging the em-
ployer to give the employee the "benefit of the doubt."
The primary attraction of the scope of employment test as a
definition for public concern speech is its high degree of learnability.
Courts have had decades of experience in applying the test to deter-
mine employer liability for employee torts. The test is easy for em-
ployers to apply as well because it is based primarily on identifiable,
objective factors. Thus, any problems Waters created with its
suggestion that the employer initially evaluate the employee's speech
are alleviated.14 2
A scope of employment test also returns the determination of
what is of public concern to those who should evaluate such matters:
the public. Instead of letting the court or the employer decide the
question of what is or should be foremost in the public's mind, any
speech aired to the public will be protected so that the public can
decide whether it is worth placing in the forefront of its own mind.
143
The inherent paternalism of the Pickering/Connick public concern
test disappears.
C. Responses to Foreseeable Objections
Practical objections would likely arise to this proposed redefi-
nition of public concern. The scope of employment test appears to
provide abundant opportunity for strategic behavior by employees.
What if the employee takes advantage of protection under the test to
air a personal grievance? What if the employee insults her supervi-
sor's wife while off duty-should such speech be protected? What if a
group of employees gets together and plots to disrupt the public
employer's workplace? Detractors may fear that the scope of
employment test allows employees too much room for manipulation or
that such a test does not properly preserve the employer's interest in
142. A scope of employment test in fact would eliminate the need for the Waters procedural
framework altogether, as the content of the speech would no longer be important.
143. This proposal also fits well with the established jurisprudence in the private sphere.
The courts have long recognized a "public policy exception" to at-will discharge from private
employment. This exception forbids retaliatory discharge (though as of yet it has not been
expanded to other forms of discipline) of an employee who reveals to the public practices of her
employer that negatively affect the public's perception of the employer. The policy, however,
does not extend to the employee who reveals practices which only affect the internal workings of
the employer. William J. Holloway and Michael J. Leech, Employment Termination: Rights
and Remedies 180-82 (Bureau of National Affairs, 2d ed. 1993) (citing cases). See, for example,
Littman v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 715 F. Supp. 90, 93-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (upholding a
discharge when in retaliation for reporting fraud on the employer to the employer).
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protecting against disruption. There are at least four possible
answers to these objections.
1. The First Amendment Is an Absolute
The simplest answer is that the First Amendment brooks no
exceptions to its dictates. The scope of employment test allows the
public employer to abridge freedom of speech only within the narrow
relationship that necessitated a departure from the First Amendment:
the public employment relationship. Outside the scope of employ-
ment, the public employee is acting in her capacity as a citizen and
the public employer cannot control her. Therefore, any incidental
effects of her speech must be treated like the effects of any citizen's
speech. The state may not abridge her speech.
2. The Personal Grievance Problem Is a Mirage
Further, some foreseeable difficulties with the proposed test do
not loom so large when evaluated in practical terms. For instance,
under the current test for public concern, personal grievances have
merited no protection whatsoever.'" Personal grievances are
presumably without protection because they hold a high potential for
disruption and an extremely low public concern value as defined by
the content of the speech. Upon closer examination, however, the
disruption potential of such a grievance is mitigated by its very
nature as a "personal" grievance.
Personal grievances, because they do not concern others, are
unlikely to have a ready audience with anyone other than the
aggrieved. Therefore, if an employee seeks to take advantage of a test
affording full protection to speech aired outside the workplace, will
probably not be able to gain an ear for her grievance. The speech will
cause no disruption, and discipline in the workplace will not be af-
fected. In other words, there is no need to regulate such speech; it is
self-regulating.
Further, the current content-based approach to public concern
speech causes special problems when applied to grievances. By
protecting any speech that consists of matters currently the subject of
144. Allred, 64 Ind. L. J. at 72 (cited in note 76); Connick, 461 U.S. at 147, 154 (stating that
the First Amendment "does not require a grant of immunity for employer grievances" and
should not be "confused with an attempt to constitutionalize the employee grievance that we see
presented here.") Lower courts shun grievances as well. See note 141 and accompanying text.
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public debate, the doctrine favors those who can turn their personal
grievances into public ones.145 Thus, public concern doctrine as it
stands does not guard against the grievance, it simply discriminates
against employees who lack the power to promote their grievances as
public debates. At the same time, the doctrine denies those without
such power the means to turn their grievances into public concerns. 146
3. The Scope of Employment Analysis Itself
Eliminates Some Concerns
The scope of employment test itself may prove flexible enough
to eliminate some projected concerns over its application. Because the
test depends on the particular employment relationship in question, it
responds on its own to the employer's concerns over disruption.
Some public employees have a greater potential to disrupt the
workplace because of their job descriptions. When the public
employer's function is intimately connected with its public
appearance, as with certain public officials, any comment by an
immediate subordinate that disparages the employer may seriously
undermine the employer's position. In such cases, critics may argue,
the speech of such subordinates-the staff of a United States
Senator's office, for example-should be controlled to a greater extent
than that of the "average" public employee.
This concern, however, is easily addressed by defining public
concern speech by the scope of employment test. The first prong of
the test, "authorized conduct," will depend on the type of job the pub-
lic employee holds. A member of a Senator's staff will be authorized
to engage in certain conduct, speaking to the media, for example, that
would not be authorized for other employees. Thus the Senator's staff
member is acting within the scope of her employment when she is
uttering the disruptive speech the Senator fears, and the Senator may
discharge her if her speech disrupts her work environment.
4. Let Established First Amendment Jurisprudence Do Its Job
Finally, much of the "dangerous" speech that critics might fear
would be protected under a scope of employment test is already
outside the realm of protection under general first amendment
doctrine. For instance, an employee's personal slur concerning her
145. Estlund, 59 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 38-39 (cited in note 94).
146. Id.
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employer may be defamatory. The defamed employer is free to sue
the defaming worker. There is also scholarship suggesting that
personal insults are unprotected under the First Amendment.147
Thus, an employee's purely personal attack on a supervisor might be
actionable even if non-defamatory.
In addition, the Supreme Court, along with several lower
courts, has recognized discipline for "insubordination" to be distinct
from discipline for speech."48 Though this may seem a purely seman-
tic line to draw, employers who depend on the close personal loyalty of
their immediate subordinates have a strong argument that disloyalty
equals insubordination.19  Further, the Court in NTEU suggested
that such an appearance of impropriety is not a concern that should
easily outweigh the First Amendment.1 50 Thus, insubordination by
speech may not deserve great attention as a "problem" under the
proposed test.
Comments outside the scope of employment are not unreach-
able under the First Amendment. They are only unreachable under
the public employee exception to freedom speech.
147. This suggestion arises from the Coures use of the phrase "personal insult when
evaluating fighting words under current first amendment jurisprudence. See Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (holding that the words "Fuck the Draft' printed on the back
of a jacket cannot reasonably be considered a "personal insul' and that therefore the phrase
cannot be considered fighting words and is protected under the First Amendment); Hess v.
Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 107 (1973) (holding that epithets hurled during a public meeting were
not "personal insults" because they were not directed at any particular person or group and
therefore were not regulable as fighting words). Many commentators have used the Cohen
Court's apparent focus on the words themselves rather than their effect on the listener to argue
that even without such an effect (imminent violence), insults fall outside the protection of the
First Amendment. See Patricia B. Hodulik, Prohibiting Discriminatory Harassment by
Regulating Student Speeck A Balancing of First Amendment and University Interests, 16 J.
Coll. & Univ. L. 573, 583-84 (1990) (describing the University of Wisconsin's interpretation of
the aforementioned cases to provide an exception for purely personal insults); Richard Delgado,
Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 Harv.
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 133, 175-79 (1982) (examining racial insults under the First Amendment and
concluding that they serve no valid first amendment purpose).
148. See Rothstein, Knapp, and Liebman, Employment Law at ch. 11 (cited in note 1).
149. See also Henry V. Nickel, The First Amendment and Public Employees-An Emerging
Constitutional Right to Be a Policeman?, 37 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 410, 424 (1968) (arguing that
dismissal can be justified if "[t]he government in such a case is not imposing a sanction upon the
employee's speech but, rather, is sanctioning his inability to perform the function the govern-
ment is paying him to perform").
150. NTEU, 115 S. Ct. at 1017.
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V. CONCLUSION
Waters makes it more imperative than ever to arrive at a clear
definition of public concern speech. By placing the initial power to
evaluate public concern with the employer,151 Waters creates a night-
mare for employees. If only a "substantial likelihood"1s 2 of protection
will trigger an employer evaluation of the speech before discipline, the
employee's chances of gaining protection are lessened in direct rela-
tion to the ambiguity of the public concern test. The public concern
test must therefore be a clear test easily applied in everyday
situations.
It is also imperative that the Court not lose sight of the pur-
pose behind the First Amendment. Our freedom of speech ensures
that we are at all times in control of our government and not vice
versa. It enables us to bring about change and identify problems in
their infancy. That freedom should not be unduly restricted solely in
the name of "efficiency."
The Court's current definition of public concern cannot satisfy
either of these goals. The Court's application of a content-based
analysis is inappropriate and causes several doctrinal problems. The
Court should redefine public concern along purely context-based lines
by importing the common-law agency doctrine of scope of employ-
ment. Such a definition would result in a more even playing field for
the employee and protect the public employee's ability to identify
problems in the workplace and bring them to the attention of the
general public. The employer would still be able to regulate speech
within the scope of employment, but its control would not extend to
censorship of speech outside the relationship that necessitated
infringement of the First Amendment in the first place. This redefini-
tion would uphold the dictates of the First Amendment and ensure
that an employee does not forfeit her rights upon entering the public
workplace.
Karin B. Hoppmann*
151. See notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
152. Waters, 511 U.S. at 677.
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